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 The Scope of the Removal Power Is Ripe for Reconsideration 
 
By Richard J. Pierce Jr.   
 
I have been teaching and writing about the power of the president to remove officers of the United 
States for over 40 years. Until recently, however, I have been content to describe the Supreme 
Court’s opinions that address the scope issue without attempting to persuade the Court to change 
its approach to the issue.  
The issue has become particularly important in the last few years for two reasons. First, the 
scope issue has become particularly important because of the increasing controversy that surrounds 
the scope of the removal power in the context of officers who perform purely adjudicatory 
functions. In its 2018 opinion in Lucia v. SEC, the Supreme Court held that SEC ALJs are officers 
of the United States.1 The holding is broad enough to encompass virtually all ALJs and AJs.2 In a 
brief filed in the Supreme Court in that case, the solicitor general (SG) tried to persuade the Court 
to hold that the longstanding limits on the power to remove an ALJ are either invalid or 
meaningless.3 Those limits are based on due process. The Court decided not to address the removal 
issue in that case, but it is only a matter of time until the Court addresses the issue. 
The second reason the scope issue has become particularly important is tied to the growing 
movement to broaden the scope of the power of the president to remove officers who perform 
executive functions.  C That effort is motivated by concern that limits on the removal power 
interfere impermissibly with the president’s responsibility to perform the functions vested in the 
president by Article II of the Constitution.  
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Thus, for instance, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of the removal power and 
reduced the power of Congress to limit the removal power in its 2010 opinion in Free Enterprise 
Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.4 The Court held that Congress cannot limit 
the president’s removal power by imposing two or more layers of for cause limits on the removal 
power. Because the president can only remove a member of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) for cause, the Court wrote, the for cause limit on the SEC’s power to remove 
members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) violated Article II. 
A panel of the D.C. Circuit took a step beyond Free Enterprise Fund in 2016, holding that 
the single layer of for cause limit on the president’s power to remove the director of the Consumer 
Financial Protection Board (CFPB) violated Article II.5 The en banc D.C. Circuit overturned that 
decision, but there are reasons to believe that final resolution of the issue is far from over. The 
judge who wrote the panel opinion, Judge Kavanagh, was appointed to the Supreme Court, where 
he will be in a better position to influence the outcome of the inevitable future disputes about the 
scope of the removal power. In 2018, a panel of the Fifth Circuit renewed the dispute in an 
analogous context by holding unconstitutional the for cause limit on the president’s power to 
remove the director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).6 
This article looks at the history of Supreme Court cases addressing removal power. Based 
on a discussion of those cases, including a landmark opinion  written by former chief justice (and 
former president) William Howard Taft, the article concludes that the Supreme Court should hold 
that the president must have the power to remove at will any officer who performs executive 
functions to enable the president to perform the functions vested in the president by Article II. By 
contrast, the article concludes the Court should hold that due process precludes the president from 
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having the power to remove at will an officer whose sole responsibilities are to adjudicate disputes 
between private parties and the government. 
 
Methodology and Findings 
I began my effort to understand the scope issue by reading and studying with care all of the major 
judicial decisions that have addressed the scope issue. I came away from that effort with two 
pleasant surprises. First, with two exceptions, the opinions are better reasoned than I remembered. 
Second, with the same two exceptions, the opinions form a coherent and consistent pattern. Courts 
consistently protect the president’s power to perform the functions vested in him by Article II by 
holding that he or one of his immediate subordinates must have the power to remove at will any 
officer who performs purely executive functions. At the same time, courts consistently protect the 
due process rights of parties to disputes with the government by limiting the power of the president 
or an agency head to remove any officer who performs purely adjudicatory functions. 
 
The President Must Have the Power to Remove at Will Officers Who Perform Executive 
Functions    
The logical starting point in any attempt to understand the opinions that address the scope of the 
removal power is the 1926 opinion of Chief Justice Taft in Myers v. United States.7 That opinion 
upheld President Wilson’s decision to remove a postmaster from office. It is often described as 
holding that Congress cannot limit in any way the president’s power to remove any officer. That 
description is incomplete in ways that are misleading. Taft’s 71-page opinion addressed many 
issues with care. 
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Taft did not focus on President Wilson’s removal of postmaster Myers in the 1920s. He 
focused primarily on President Andrew Johnson’s decision to remove the Secretary of War in the 
1860s. He also did not address explicitly the issue that has drawn most of the attention of courts—
whether Congress can limit the president’s removal power by requiring a statement of cause for 
removing an officer. The restriction on removal at issue in Myers was the Tenure in Office Act, a 
statute that Congress enacted in 1867. That statute purported to limit the president’s removal power 
by requiring the president to obtain the permission of the Senate before removing any officer. The 
opinion in Myers was the logical antecedent to modern opinions like INS v. Chadha8 and Bowsher 
v. Synar,9 in which the Court held that Congress cannot aggrandize itself by giving itself a role in 
performing functions that are vested in the president by Article II.             
Taft discussed in detail the controversy that led Congress to enact the Tenure in Office Act 
and to impeach and to attempt to remove from office President Johnson for refusing to comply 
with that statute by firing the Secretary of War without first obtaining the permission of the Senate. 
Congress and President Johnson differed dramatically with respect to the most important question 
at the time—how to reconstruct the country after the Civil War. Congress enacted the Tenure in 
Office Act in an effort to make it impossible for President Johnson to exercise the powers vested 
in him by Article II in the context of his attempt to reunite and reconstruct the country. 
In the course of his lengthy opinion, Taft described and supported three broad propositions 
that are important to an understanding of the removal power. First, he explained why the president 
must be able to appoint many officers to be able to perform effectively the functions vested in the 
president by Article II. The task is far too massive to be accomplished by a president without the 
aid of agents. Second, he explained why the president must have the discretion to remove officers 
at will. If an officer attempts to move the nation in a direction that is inconsistent with the 
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president’s policies, the president cannot perform the functions vested in him by Article II unless 
he has the discretion to remove that officer. Third, if Congress wants to make it impossible for the 
president to perform the functions vested in him by Article II, it can do so most effectively by 
limiting the power of the president to remove an officer. To chief justice (and former president) 
Taft, it followed that Congress cannot limit the president’s discretion to remove officers with 
executive functions.   
I find Taft’s explanation of his three broad propositions persuasive, particularly coming 
from a former president. Many of the most important later opinions repeat and build on Taft’s 
reasoning and conclusions in Myers. Thus, for instance, the opinion in Free Enterprise Fund 
supports its ban on multiple levels of for cause limits on the removal power with reference to the 
reasoning in Myers.10 The Free Enterprise Fund opinion supplements the reasoning in Myers with 
reasoning based on political accountability, such as, the public cannot know who is responsible for 
a government policy decision unless the president has the power to remove a policy making official 
at will. 
Similarly, Judge (now Justice) Kavanagh used reasoning like the reasoning in Myers, 
supplemented by reasoning based on political accountability, in his opinion that held 
unconstitutional the for cause limit on the president’s power to remove the director of the CFPB. 
Thus, for instance, he emphasized that the director “unilaterally implements and enforces 
[nineteen] federal consumer protection statutes, covering everything from home finance to credit 
cards to banking practices.”11 He reasoned that anyone with that broad range of executive 
responsibilities must be removable by the president at will to allow the president to perform the 
functions vested in him by Article II and to allow the public to hold the president accountable for 
the policies the government adopts and attempts to further in each of the many contexts in which 
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the director has the unilateral power to make and to implement policy on behalf of the government. 
The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in support of its holding that the for cause limit on the president’s 
power to remove the director of the FHFA12 is virtually identical to the reasoning in Judge (now 
Justice) Kavanagh’s opinion with respect to the Director of the CFPB. 
Taft’s opinion in Myers also includes another discussion that is important to an 
understanding of the Court’s views with respect to the appropriate scope of the removal power. He 
devoted four pages of his opinion to discussion of the postmaster’s argument that he could not be 
removed at will because the Court had upheld limits on the power of the president to remove 
territorial judges.13 After discussing the conflicting opinions in which the Court had addressed that 
question, the chief justice referred with apparent approval to the opinion of Justice McLean: 
 
He pointed out that the argument upon which the decision rested was based on the necessity 
for presidential removals in the discharge by the President of his executive duties and his 
taking care that the laws be faithfully executed, and that such an argument could not apply 
to the judges, over whose judicial duties he could not properly exercise any supervision or 
control after their appointment and confirmation.14  
 
The chief justice then explicitly disavowed any intent to apply the reasoning and holding 
in Myers to non-Article III judges:The question whether  *   *   * Congress may provide 
for [a territorial judge’s] removal in some other way present considerations different from 





The opinion in Free Enterprise Fund includes a similar explicit disavowal of any intent to 
apply its reasoning or holding to officers who perform adjudicative functions, noting that 
“administrative law judges perform adjudicative functions rather than enforcement functions.”16 
 
Due Process Limits the Power to Remove Officers Who Perform Only Adjudicative 
Functions 
A few years after it issued its opinion in Myers, the Court issued its famous opinion in Humphrey’s 
Executor v. United States.17 The Court upheld the statutory for cause limit on the president’s power 
to remove an FTC Commissioner. The opinion in Humphrey’s has traditionally been interpreted 
to be inconsistent with the opinion in Myers and to authorize Congress to create agencies with vast 
power that are “independent” of the president. Neither of those interpretations is supported by the 
reasoning in the Humphrey’s opinion and the context in which the opinion was issued. The opinion 
in Humphrey’s can support an interpretation that reconciles it with the opinion in Myers and that 
does not legitimate the concept of multifunction agencies that are independent of the president. 
The FTC of 1935 was nothing like the modern FTC or the agencies that have been the 
subject of the recent decisions that have held invalid restrictions on the removal of officers—
PCAOB, CFPB, and FHFA. Each of those agencies has the power to make policy decisions on 
behalf of the government by issuing legislative rules that have the same legally binding effect as a 
statute. By contrast, the FTC of 1935 had no power to make policy through the issuance of rules 
or through any other means.  
The Court distinguished the functions performed by the FTC from the executive functions 
performed by the officers who were the subject of the holding in Myers.  The Court characterized 
the FTC of 1935 as a “quasi legislative and quasi-judicial” body.18 In its capacity as a quasi-
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legislative body, the FTC of 1935 performed the functions that are performed by congressional 
staff and the Congressional Research Service (CRS) today. Congress had little staff support until 
1946, and CRS was not created until 1970.19 In 1935, Congress had to rely on the FTC to study 
the performance of markets and to make recommendations with respect to the need to enact 
legislation to authorize regulation of markets. FTC reports to Congress were the basis for many 
statutes, including the Natural Gas Act and the Federal Power Act.20 It made sense for Congress 
to insulate the officers in charge of conducting research for Congress from at will removal by the 
president. 
In its capacity as a quasi-judicial body, the FTC acted as a specialized forum to adjudicate 
trade disputes. The Court analogized it to the Court of Claims.21 In its adjudicative capacity, the 
FTC of 1935 was also analogous to the Territorial Courts that the Myers Court distinguished from 
agencies that perform executive functions. As the Myers Court recognized, the president “could 
not properly exercise any supervision or control” over judges who were appointed to the Territorial 
courts.22 It follows that a for cause limit on the power of the president to remove a Commissioner 
of the FTC of 1935 was entirely consistent with the holding in Myers that the president must have 
the power to remove at will officers who perform executive functions. 
The Court followed its opinion in Humphrey’s Executor with its 1958 opinion in Wiener 
v. United States.23  The Court held that the president could not remove a member of the three-
member War Claims Tribunal without stating a cause for removal. Wiener can be interpreted to 
support the proposition that due process limits the power of the president to remove an officer with 
adjudicative responsibilities. There was no statutory limit on the president’s power to remove a 
member of the War Claims Tribunal. The Court adopted a construction of the statute that included 
such a limit because the Tribunal was tasked only with “adjudicating [claims] according to law, 
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that is on the merits of each claim, supported by evidence and governing legal considerations.”24 
The Court reasoned that Congress intended the members of the Tribunal to have the same freedom 
from potential outside influences that the judges of the District Courts and the Court of Claims 
had.25 It followed that the president could not remove a member of the Tribunal without stating a 
cause for removal. 
In the meantime, Congress was engaged in a lengthy investigation and debate to devise and 
implement means of assuring that the hearing examiners (later renamed ALJs) who presided in 
hearings to adjudicate disputes between private parties and the government did so in an unbiased 
manner.26 Many parties who participated in those adjudications complained that ALJs behaved in 
ways that reflected a powerful bias in favor of the government. Many studies supported the claims 
of bias.  
After 17 years of investigation and debate, Congress addressed the problem of bias in 1946 
by enacting the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by unanimous voice vote in both the House 
and Senate.27 The most important provisions of the APA are designed to assure that ALJs preside 
over adjudicatory hearings in an unbiased manner. They include provisions that prohibit an agency 
from determining the compensation of an ALJ,28 assigning an ALJ responsibilities that are 
inconsistent with the duties of an ALJ,29 and, most important, removing or otherwise punishing an 
ALJ. An ALJ can be removed only for cause found by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) 
after conducting a formal hearing.30 
In its 1950 opinion in Wong Yang Sun v. McGrath,31 the Court praised Congress for 
investigating the serious problem of bias in hearings conducted to adjudicate disputes between 
private parties and the government. The Court also praised Congress for including in the APA 
provisions that greatly reduced the risk of bias by protecting ALJs from agency pressure to conduct 
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hearings in a manner that reflected bias in favor of the agency.32 The Court compared the blatantly 
biased hearing that the immigration service had provided the private party in the case before the 
Court with the unbiased hearing that the APA assures.33 The Court held the APA applicable to 
immigration hearings even though Congress had not explicitly incorporated the APA safeguards 
of independence in the Immigration Act.34 The Court adopted a saving construction of the 
Immigration Act to avoid having to hold the statute unconstitutional as a violation of due process.35 
Congress reacted angrily to the decision in Wong Yang Sun. It amended the Immigration 
Act to make it explicit that the APA safeguards of the independence of ALJs did not apply to 
immigration judges (IJs). Faced with a direct conflict between its views of due process and those 
of Congress, the Court backed down and upheld the constitutionality of the amended Immigration 
Act over an argument that it violates due process in its 1955 opinion in Marcello v. Bonds.36 That 
opinion is one of only two opinions on the removal power that were not well-reasoned and that do 
not fit the otherwise consistent pattern of opinions that resolve scope of removal disputes based on 
the functions performed by the officer whose removal is at issue.  
In every other opinion, the Court distinguished clearly between officers who perform executive 
functions and officers who perform adjudicative functions. The Court concluded that officers who 
perform executive functions must be removable at will in order to assure that the president can 
perform the functions vested in him by Article II. The Court concluded that officers who perform 
adjudicative functions must be protected from at will removal in order to reduce the risk that they 
will conduct adjudicatory hearings in ways that reflect pro-government bias in violation of due 
process. The Court should overrule its holding in Marcello v. Bonds based on the powerful 
reasoning in its opinion in Wong Yang Sun.                                                      
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Asylum cases provide the context in which it is most important to insure that officers with 
adjudicative responsibilities are able to perform their duties without fear that they will be removed 
or otherwise punished if they do not act in ways that reflect whatever bias the president and the 
attorney general might have. Denial of a meritorious application for asylum is almost always 
followed by removal of the alien from the United States. Thus, denial of a meritorious application 
for asylum has devastating effects on the applicant, often including a high risk that the applicant 
will be killed when the applicant is forced to return to the applicant’s country of origin. 
The present circumstances illustrate the extreme risk of bias particularly well. Both the 
president and the attorney general have expressed powerful antipathy toward aliens who seek 
asylum and have applied extraordinary pressure on IJs to deny applications for asylum. That 
pressure is virtually certain to influence at least some IJs to deny applications for asylum in some 
cases in which their unbiased view of the merits would yield a decision granting the application.37 
The attorney general has the power to evaluate the performance of IJs and to remove an IJ at will.38 
It is unrealistic to believe that all IJs will have the extraordinary courage and strength of character 
required to act in a manner that is inconsistent with the expectations of the president and the 
attorney general. The Supreme Court should put an end to the blatantly unconstitutional practice 
of pressuring IJs to deny applications for asylum. 
The only other opinion in which the Court departed from the important principles of 
constitutional law that underlie most of its decisions was its 1988 opinion in Morrison v. Olson.39 
The Court upheld the statutory for cause limit on the power of the Attorney General to remove an 
independent counsel who had the power to investigate and potentially to prosecute a high-ranking 
officer executive officer for allegedly engaging in criminal conduct. The Court held that the limit 
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on the removal power was permissible even though the Court characterized prosecution as an 
executive function.40 
As I have explained at length elsewhere, the opinion in Morrison did no harm because, as 
the Court emphasized repeatedly, the independent counsel had no power to make any policy 
decision.41 The Court has never upheld a limit on the power to remove an officer who has the 
power to make policy decisions on behalf of the government. That is by far the most important 
function that is vested in the President in Article II. 
 
Conclusion 
I hope that the Supreme Court  holds that the president must have the power to remove at will any 
officer who performs executive functions to enable the president to perform the functions vested 
in the president by Article II. I also hope that the Court  holds that due process precludes the 
president from having the power to remove at will an officer whose sole responsibilities are to 
adjudicate disputes between private parties and the government. With one glaring exception, the 
Court’s opinions are consistent with those principles when they are read with care and in the 
context in which they were decided. I hope that the Court  eliminates the one outlier by overruling 
its 1955 decision in Marcello v. Bonds and holding that immigration judges cannot be removed at 
will.  
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